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University College Cork
ATTILA Z. PAPP
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
This article offers an introduction to the special issue. It presents
the arguments why a political anthropological perspective can be
particularly helpful to understand the connected political and cul-
tural challenges and opportunities posed by the situation of ethnic
and religious minorities. The article concisely introduces the major
anthropological concepts used, including liminality, trickster, im-
itation, and schismogenesis; concepts that are used together with
approaches of historical sociology and genealogy, especially con-
cerning the rise and fall of empires, and their lasting impact. The
suggested conceptual framework is particularly helpful for under-
standing howmarginal places can become liminal, appearing sud-
denly at the center of political attention. The article also shows the
manner in which minority existence can problematize the deper-
sonalizing tendencies of modern globalization.
There are, at least, five good reasons why minorities—ethnic, linguistic, or
religious—are a worthwhile, even important, area of study for the political
and social sciences. To begin with, and most simply, because they sim-
ply exist, even though often they are ignored, or belittled, following the
seemingly self-evident logic of identifying a nation-state with a single group.
Second, such groups offer color and variety; it is good to know about them,
as they help to stay aware about the multiplicity of life and culture in a
world increasingly threatened by global uniformity. Third, and even more
importantly, beyond “exotic” charm, such communities offer a reality check
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against these processes of mechanization and uniformization, moving be-
yond the idea of taking the “modern West” as an unsurpassable horizon.
Fourth, beyond merely surviving, in contrast to the dominant majority of
their respective countries, they perform, or could perform, an important role
of mediation. Fifth and perhaps most importantly, the existence of such mi-
norities both render evident and help to literally resist the arguably most
central and most pernicious aspects of modern globalization, which is not
simply standardization, mechanization, bureaucratization, commodification,
or commercialization but also depersonalization. The central aim is to an-
alyze this phenomenon with the help of concepts developed in political
anthropology.
This short introduction will offer an overview of political anthropol-
ogy,1 with a focus on its features that might have particular relevance for
minority studies. The central aim of this special issue is to suggest a theo-
retical framework for analyzing the situation and role of minorities, with a
focus on deeply divided societies, and to apply it for some European coun-
tries where significant ethnic minorities are present, and where there is a
strong religion-based conflict dividing the society. Anthropological concepts
central for this theoretical framework include liminality, imitation, trickster,
and schismogenesis; concepts that are little used, especially together, outside
specialized anthropological studies but that have particular relevance for the
study of sociopolitical conflicts in the modern world. In particular, using the
conceptual pair “marginality/liminality,” this special issue investigates how
such situations emerge in peripheral areas that are also in between major
cultural, political, and civilizational centers and in the outskirts of Europe,
and how such “marginal” places can gain a liminal position in mediating
between societies and cultures but also in becoming permanent sources of
conflict. Such at once marginal and liminal areas, studied in some details
in the articles that follow, include Hungary, Romania, Moldavia, Lithuania,
Bosnia, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland.
The reason why we offer a set of anthropological concepts that were
so far rarely used in the study of contemporary politics is dual, justifying
the undertaking from two angles. On the one hand, living as member of a
minority — ethnic, linguistic, or religious — is a matter of everyday living
and an often quite difficult, conflictual one. Studies of such situations eas-
ily require the standard anthropological or ethnographic tools of extended
fieldwork and participatory observation. However, on the other hand, the
very existence of such minorities as minorities, often quite isolated and em-
bittered minorities, is a consequence of long-term historical changes, mostly
due to the building and collapse of empires. This implies, at a first step,
the rise of a conquering empire, and its subjugation of various people, of-
ten involving forced population movements and then a protracted existence
under such an empire that often can extend for long centuries, under which
various efforts are made by central authorities to integrate and assimilate
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the conquered; eventually, the necessary collapse of an empire might lead
to situations of nation-state-building with its own homogenizing efforts as a
legacy. This also implies that the perspective of political anthropology makes
use of comparative historical sociology, especially the genealogical perspec-
tive, as pioneered by Nietzsche and developed further by Max Weber, Eric
Voegelin, and Michel Foucault.
The paradoxicality of such a situation is not always understood in con-
temporary political analysis. The reason is that the central concepts of mod-
ern social and political theorizing are closely connected to the specific an-
swer given to the concrete political and religious problems that emerged in
Europe after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire and thus the medieval
world order, but theorists fail to see the contingency of their own answers,
starting with the ideas of Machiavelli and More, and especially Hobbes. The
significance of anthropological approaches and concepts is thus not simply
that they stay close to the everyday reality of minorities but that such con-
cepts can escape the limits of taken-for-granted modern concepts, closely
tied to the (absolutist) state.
The central paradox of the postimperial situation is that the mess gener-
ated by empire-building, this “concupiscential conquest” (Voegelin), always
driven by an inner void, is not easy to clear away.2 Populations that became
mixed, as forced to live together for long decades or centuries, cannot be
easily separated. The oldest example for the absurdity of such efforts takes
us back to the Book of Ezra in the Old Testament, a first case for ethnic
cleansing, where the high priests, back — eventually — from the Babylo-
nian captivity, stood judgment over their people, expulsing those with for-
eign wives. In such a context, enforced homogenization by the “liberated”
people can be even more oppressive and violent than imperial policies;
while the seemingly “liberal” and “democratic” solution of tying down peo-
ple, in a setting where intermarriage was the fact of life since generations,
to a single and unambiguous ethnic identity can be just as oppressive and
even ludicrous.
Beyond these problems, we would like to single out for attention one
particularly problematic element of the taken-for-granted framework of mod-
ern European thought, associated with the legal, administrative, bureau-
cratic, processual, and policy-obsessed aspects of state formation. This is the
increased depersonalization associated with the rise of the modern world
— not exclusive to politics, but particularly pronounced there, and rendered
visible by various minorities.
DEPERSONALIZATION VERSUS THE MINORITY PERSON
The problem of the depersonalizing effects of the modern state and modern
capitalism was at the heart of Max Weber’s work. This aspect, which cannot
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be reduced to the more specific diagnoses of “bureaucratization” or “ra-
tionalization,” has recently been emphasized by Wilhelm Hennis, a political
scientist who argued that Max Weber’s central theme of work was concerned
with the tension between personality and the “life orders” under contempo-
rary conditions.3 It is due to perceiving such depersonalizing effects that
Weber was intrigued by Nietzsche’s diagnosis of modern nihilism, animating
some of his last conclusive words, like the January 1919 lecture Politics as a
Vocation, containing the passage “Not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but
rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness … [w]here there is noth-
ing,”4 giving a negative response to the still open ending of the Protestant
Ethic, envisioning that the “last men” of this civilizational development could
be “ ‘specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart: this nullity imagines
that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved,”’5 or his
last completed lecture course on General Economic History in the 1919–20
winter term, ending with evoking a new “Iron Age.”6
Such diagnoses are notable not simply due to their pessimism but by
capturing a type of development where depersonalization is continually in-
creasing, paradoxically together with rising individualism and fake person-
alization. This is because the term “individual” has two radically different
shades of meaning. On the one hand, the “individual” stands for the con-
crete, single human being, implying the myriad ties and connections one
carries within his or her person — family, friends, and colleagues or re-
ligious, ethnic, linguistic, and professional. On the other, in both modern
economics and the “public sphere,” the individual is a single, atomized en-
tity, alchemically separated from every possible tie, left with nothing else
but one’s “interests” (a word itself capturing in-between-ness but here trans-
mogrified into something objectified “inside” the individual) and reasoning
power; thus, a conceptualization perfectly compatible with the most extreme
depersonalization. Depersonalization divides entities, where each divided
entity must construct an “identity” that would then be “recognized” by the
others; quite close to the analogy of the way the nation-states “recognize”
each other, in the Westphalian system. However, the multiplication of rec-
ognized identities does not necessarily mean an undisturbed personality but
quite the opposite. Over time the negative aspects of depersonalization and
the deep-seated anxieties it produces are also becoming more and more ev-
ident and dominant, leading to increasing warfare and conflicts, not only in
the past but the present as well.
Thus, beyond terms like “ambivalence” or even “tension,” we need con-
cepts that can capture together both sides of modernity, depersonalization,
and individualization and the increasing gap and tension between the “per-
son” (the authentic, concrete self) and the “individual” (a bundle of sensa-
tion that tries to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, “constructing” one’s
identity). There is an anthropologically derived term that does this feat, and
this is “bipolarity,” developed by Gregory Bateson on the basis of his earlier
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concept of “schismogenesis.” Here, we immediately enter at the heart of the
history of the long past centuries, the schismatic history of the civilization
to which we belong. Such schisms include the Great Schism between east-
ern and western Christianity, the Reformation and the subsequent further
schisms within western Christianity, the schisms between nations and social
classes, resulting in the social and national problems tearing apart the con-
tinent and leading to World War I, the East–West schism of the Cold War,
and, most recently, the waves of mass migrations that became a new state
of normalcy in the contemporary world.
By pursuing Weber’s diagnosis one of the central anthropological con-
cepts has already been introduced. In the next sections, a more systematic
introduction will be offered about the central anthropological concepts on
which this special issue relies.
POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
The idea that social theory needs not only a historical but also an anthro-
pological dimension goes back to the classics. Weber tried to incorporate
anthropological studies into his approach, while Emile Durkheim, his con-
temporary, directly championed an anthropological perspective to sociol-
ogy. However, the most relevant anthropological ideas do not derive from
Durkheimian sociology but rather from its main dissenters. These include
Arnold van Gennep, who in his Rites de passage introduced the idea “limi-
nality,” Gabriel Tarde, who suggested the centrality of the term “imitation,”
thus redirecting sociology to Platonic foundation, close to the ideas of Alexis
de Tocqueville, and even Marcel Mauss, Durkheim’s nephew and designated
heir, whose ideas about the importance of praying (theme of his unfinished
dissertation) and gift relations directly challenged the Durkheimian focus on
rituals of sacrifice, or Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and his focus of participation, away
from Durkheim’s neo-Kantian concept “collective representations.” Further
ideas that were for a long time marginal even for anthropology but now are
increasingly becoming central, through political anthropology, for social and
political analysis include the “trickster” and “schismogenesis.”7
Within the scope and limits of this writing, it is not possible to intro-
duce these various ideas in detail. We can only illustrate how they all hang
together. This offers a novel way to analyze the genesis of the modern world
in depersonalization, through a series of concepts that were developed by
anthropologists in their studies of nonmodern and non-Western societies.
It thus overcomes the central problem of self-referentiality in social theory:
analyzing the rise and dynamics of modern societies in emptying entities by
concepts developed from within these same societies.
To start with, liminality helps to capture and analyze, with a degree
of analytical rigor, what happens under ephemeral and fluid conditions of
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transition and uncertainty.8 Rites of passage are those rituals that assist the
transition of a group of individuals, or an entire community, through major
points of passage in life: birth and death, adulthood and marriage, illness
or other types of crises, or simply the rhythm of seasons. They have three
phases: rites of separation; the rite itself, a performance or testing; and the
rites of reaggregation. The main liminal moment is the middle stage, but
each of the three phases is liminal in its own way.
While the concept was developed through studying rituals actually
staged in various small-scale populations in the world, its relevance for the
modern world, or for understanding the dynamics of historical events, is
evident. A social, political, or economic crisis can be analyzed as a real-
world large-scale moment of transition in which the taken-for-granted, sta-
ble structures of social and human life are suddenly suspended, and there
is an intense search for a solution. This is the type of situation that was
at the center of Max Weber’s political sociology, the problem of an “out-
of-ordinary” (ausseralltägliche) situation, for which he developed the term
“charisma.” For Weber, out-of-ordinary situations cannot be solved by ordi-
nary, traditional-customary, or rational-legalistic means, because the stability
that is the basis of such solutions was undermined. They require the appear-
ance of a special kind of person who has “charisma” or a transcendental
power for transformation. Weber clearly intimated that Europe after WWI re-
quired such leaders, but there are never guarantees that such persons would
arrive.
Political sociologists and political scientists over the past century metic-
ulously applied the Weberian terminology to the actual “out-of-ordinary” po-
litical leaders of the past century, without paying attention to the question
whether these leaders had genuine charismatic qualities. This is where the
anthropological concept “trickster,” invented by Paul Radin, is particularly
helpful.9 Tricksters abound in folktales, mythologies, and ethnographic ac-
counts in most cultures of the planet. The trickster is a peculiar in-between
figure, specialized in soul fetching or depersonalization. It is the eternal
outsider, not member of any community, not participating, thus not hav-
ing emotional ties, but for the very same reason able to perceive how it is
possible to direct others through their emotions, or even outright stimulate
or produce emotions in others, literally playing with human emotions as
if on a musical instrument. They are lonely wanderers, moving from one
place to another, always in search of conditions where they could suddenly
jump from the periphery into the center, making themselves useful, even in-
dispensable, convincing people to accept the changes in themselves. Thus,
tricksters are living paradoxes, both outcasts and culture heroes, in many
cultures even considered as second founders of the world. The trickster is
a central conceptual tool complementing Weber’s “charisma” in capturing a
type of political leader that is outside both the realm of tradition and legal
Individualization as Depersonalization 7
rationality. The conditions that favor their rise are situations of distress or
crisis, where stabilities are dissolved, emotions become high, and people
look for somebody who could guide them out of disorder.
In order to understand the trickster mode of operation, we need to
review in some detail, what happens in uncertain and anguishing periods of
transition. As the taken-for-granted order of things has become suspended,
the form of conduct that were previously followed could no longer offer
guidance. There is an intense search for new solutions with the mind being
particularly excited. However, this coincides with emotional involvement,
making the work of thinking difficult. In great distress, individuals look for
each other in search of a solution or model to follow and, thus, can easily be
induced to follow a course of action that otherwise they would never take,
characteristic of crowd behavior, especially in panic, analyzed by Gustave
le Bon, a contemporary of Nietzsche and a major source of the thinking of
Durkheim, Tarde, Pareto, and Freud — and also, through Sorel, of Mussolini,
Hitler, and Lenin. Thus, liminal situations jointly incite both reasoning and
emotions.
Under such conditions imitative processes can easily spiral out of con-
trol, characteristic of violent mob action, even scapegoating, analyzed so
well by René Girard or Gabriel Tarde. However, the situation is different if
there are some people within the community who manage to use their sense
and offer a solution. These are, in a Weberian terminology, the genuinely
charismatic persons, who rise up to the opportunity and lead the commu-
nity out of the crisis. The problem is that the same situations also favor
tricksters, whose mind remains clear, as they are not emotionally involved
in the community and do not have an interest in finding a solution. Quite on
the contrary: As a trickster can only gain attention in a crisis, its only interest
is in perpetuating situations of crisis. It can capture attention with slogans
that seem to offer a way out — people in a state of distress are not terribly
good in making distinctions, their sense of judgment being undermined —
but that instead only spirals further the very forces that generated the crisis.
There can be two basic outcomes of such a situation, which can also
be combined. If a temporary situation of crisis is perpetuated, we are faced
with a paradoxical condition of permanent liminality10 that is based on de-
personalization and further promotes the same transformation from a person
into a nonentity (Weber’s “nullity”). The second main outcome is schismo-
genesis,11 which means that a temporary breech or fracture in the social
fabric, instead of being healed, is rather extended and aggravated until it be-
comes a permanent condition. The trickster logic here implies that instead
of finding a way to close the gap and to resolve the conflict, the diverging
positions are rather getting more and more distant from each other, until the
previous unity is replaced by two sets of strongly different identities. Central
for Bateson’s concept is the modeling of the process by which the previous
positions of identity are replaced by the two new identities, based both on
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the redefinition of the “self” and of the “other” and the progressive taking
into account in the definition of the self how the other “labeled” this self.
The unfolding of schismatic processes is not a once-for-all event but
rather, following the logic of “Bateson’s Rule,” one fracture can lead to an-
other. Schisms can multiply with a new identity splitting into further halves.
The European Reformation of the 16th century offers a perfect example, with
fragmenting only stopped by all partners recognizing the others so as not
to allow further destructive splitting, culminating in the establishment of the
official churches. A similar example is offered by the socialist movements of
the past centuries.
THE MINORITY PERSON
Without romantically overvaluing the challenges inherent in a minority exis-
tence, the anthropological concepts presented above offer a suitable frame-
work for interpreting the particular position of members of ethnic or reli-
gious minorities.
According to Weber, the dynamic relations between ethnic groups can
be described as a set of attractions and repulsions, while the groups them-
selves possess moral customs that can build communities.12 Some authors
place the emphasis on the boundaries between ethnic groups,13 while oth-
ers interpret ethnicity as a framework to perceive social differences.14 There
is consensus that the interpretation of national minorities must be situated
with the relationship between the nationalizing state and the kin-state.15 In
this context, ethnicity or ethnic identity emerges through the interaction that
is taking place between groups: Ethnicity “exists between and not within
groups [emphasis in original].”16
The presence of minorities, or citizens who share a different culture or
language, presents both an opportunity and a threat for the majority that
usually possesses political hegemony. The assessment of minorities usu-
ally depends on the ruling political perspective: If a modern nation-state
wants to demonstrate its own pluralism, it uses all political and legal means
to demonstrate the existence and thriving of minority groups — especially
outside its own borders—in order to receive recognition from other nation-
states or supranational organization. Here, however, immediately a trickster
aspect appears, through an internal contradiction, as a nation-state necessar-
ily means national homogenization and, thus, strives for homogeneity. Thus,
minorities regard the occasional tolerance of the local nation-state, just as the
special favors offered by the distant kin-state, with due skepticism.
The moments and consequences of the collapses of empires are thus
always different in the memory and interpretation of the “winners” and
the “losers.” The “winners,” the majorities, found a home, while the mi-
norities became losers, drifting into endless homelessness and entertain-
ing new expectations while forced into an imposed political entity. Yet, at
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the same time, those with a shared culture and experiences generate close
communities where the hope that the obstacles deployed against the free
use of the proper language and culture would once be lifted. The daily life
of a minority person is sometimes only latently, sometimes manifestly, pen-
etrated by the dominant concern of preventing those actions of the majority
that are supposedly oriented towards eliminating the very survival of the
minorities.
The persons inside such (forced) communities, however, apart from
the evident losses and deprivation, also received a chance17: As one’s very
existence became defined in contrast to the majority, often conceived as
an enemy, this gave the opportunity of living, inside the modern world,
as member of a particularly closely knit and personalized community,
reversing — at this concrete time and place — the dominant modern
tendency of depersonalization. Thus, living as a member of a concrete
community offers the chance of intimate inwardliness (benso˝ségesség; a
term quite different from individualizing but also depersonalizing privacy
and intimacy), recovering a genuine dialogue all but lost in modernity. The
dialogue of minority persons thus is not conducted between atomized and
universal individuals, rather between persons who belong to the same eth-
nocultural community. The permanentization of such a dialogue might lead
to a kind of inbreeding but can be an instrument for offering a transition
from homelessness to a home. The realization of the hope of independence
might shift a minority person out of this personalized world; thus, after the
collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy or the Soviet Union several previous
minorities suddenly became majorities, thus founding a home, and as the
“new victors” started to act in every manner according to the logic of the
majority nation-state, even in confrontation with their own new minorities.
A minority person can choose between several life strategies: One can
take upon oneself a mediating role between the various linguistic, ethnic,
and political entities (different minorities or the various, neighboring nation-
states), but one can also follow the policy of separation or even of some or
other versions of ethnic resistance. Whatever strategy is chosen, the actions
will be pervaded by some kind of hope and the public demonstration of this
hope. In the first strategy, it is the idea-ideal of “eternal peace” or “tolerance”
that transpires, while, in the second, a belief in autonomy of one kind or
another (individual, institutional-cultural, or territorial). A minority person
always lives in some kind of belief, hope, teleology, or in an eternal in-
between state and, thus, can easily be deluded, especially if someone evokes
danger, crying wolf. And danger or threat is never far from the horizon of
minority existence; a minority person, if only to heal or at least to sooth a
trauma, needs to believe in a better world to come. So, a minority person
must build on this paradoxical, as if structural metaxy-existence,18 on the
bridging between present and future, good and evil, no-longer-majority and
yet-still-minority, or only-minority and not-majority.
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The minority elite works on these same bridging, often accepting and
even feeding those ideologies and hopes that could tilt the minority into
a fulfilled future. This requires a certain imitation, the imitation of the elite
behavior by minority members, which also offers an opportunity for var-
ious internal and external tricksters to appear. By internal tricksters, we
mean those individuals or ideas that, already before adherence to a minority
community, were connected in one way or another to the “saving” of the
minorities; whereas, external tricksters are those potential saviors or ideas
that attempt to “save” the presumed minority community subsequently and
from the outside. Here, it is important, at least in a Central-Eastern European
context, to emphasize the role of the “home country” (where the ethnic mi-
nority of one country constitutes the majority in another), where political
actors, and not always for the right kind of reasons, come to emphasize the
solution or “arrangement” of the minority problem or the “saving” of the
minority persons considered as “authentic.”
The relationship between kin-state politicians and the minority commu-
nity can be characterized by mutual, calculative, mistrustful incomprehen-
sion, thus involving irresolvable contradictions. In order to understand the
inherent trickster aspect of this relationship, we first need to realize that,
no matter how such communities are unified, they still contain their own
inner differentiation. While, due to their common goals, minority persons
behave in a quite similar manner, they have certain segments, whether in a
regional or social sense, which contain sociocultural essences that resonate
better with the kin-state actors — or at least make them pretend so.19 Such
an entangled relationship can be considered as a joint trick of the kin-state
majority (or at least its political representatives) and the minority, against
genuine pluralism, where some kind of mutual imitation is staged, in order
to reach some kind of proclaimed authenticity.
Minority persons often act as if they were a majority, only demonstrat-
ing their minority being by this very feature. They identify themselves with
a minority existence as if they were not at all like that: They politicize and
act as if they were the majority, even bracketing their minority identity.
This even applies to the more “authentic” minority persons, who — meet-
ing somebody from the kin-state majority — can easily gain inspiration for
forgetting their own minority identity. But how is this possible? It is based
on two premises: On the one hand, the minority person is capable of using
an ambivalent language,20 through which it can discursively appropriate the
complex and manifold minority–majority relationship. On the other hand, a
majority member of the kin-state by visiting the minority communities might
leave for a time his own social existence, entering the personal world of
minority communities that are perceived as authentic. This is an indication
of the bipolarity of the modern world between individual and person.
In the minority community, the member of the kin-state is not “in-
digenous” but rather participates in an alien world where one knows the
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language and — to some extent — the culture. The perceived closeness of
the minority people and the authenticity experienced actually strengthens a
“trickster” identity in the kin-state person, who comes to believe that one
can actually “save” the minorities through one’s own means. The question
is to what extent this benefits the minorities. Perhaps, by making them for-
get even more their minority existence, as the (external) kin-state trickster
elevates them to such heights where only majority persons can accede. This
thus offers one a certain experience of authenticity, which, however, is very
different from the need for authenticity demanded by kin-state persons. Still,
on the part of both sides such acts become means for a further deperson-
alization or an escape from one’s own inner void. It remains to be seen
to what extent they merely fall into each other’s traps, and whether they
will be capable of a genuine dialogue, of a similar living and interpreting
of space and time. A minority person is not always dreaming about some-
body saving him, thus the kin-state politician can easily lose one’s charis-
matic aura, revealing his role as the savior of minorities as a mere mask.
Thus, one can well imagine the relationship between minority and kin-
state persons as one of a mutual and watchful glaring at each other from a
distance.
The minority person himself, and any encounter with him have a liminal
character. The emergence of such a mode of existence is always due to
some kind of social schism, often of a multiple kind, and one’s further,
traumatic life is conduced on the borders between various worlds, often
even encompassing the role of the victim or the scapegoat. In encounters
between various minorities and majorities, however, not only the majority
persons can redefine their own positions, even themselves, but even the
minority persons. Such continuous, dynamic transitions can produce new
and new minority identities, which the “majority” might try again and again
to understand or — due to its desire to transcend itself by such identification
—incorporate and thus abolish.
THE MEANINGS OF MINORITY EXISTENCE
It might seem strange that all the articles in this special issue deal with
marginal areas of Europe; in fact, mostly of extremely marginal areas. While
we cannot claim comprehensiveness, not even full representativity, this is by
no means accidental. The problem of minority existence is indeed something
characteristic of the margins of Europe, and not of its — broad — center.
Even further, practically all the areas discussed in the articles fell outside
the area of the former Roman Empire. This is all the more strange as the
question of empires, their rise and collapse, was extensively discussed in
the articles, including — quite prominently — the Byzantine world or the
Eastern Roman Empire. Yet, here again, the western core is out of the scope.
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The reason concerns the specific affinities between empire-building,
nation-state-building, and homogenization. Empire-building is driven by an
insatiable drive for conquest, the very insatiability fueled by an inner void
and, thus, the loss of meaning. The more the empire is extended, the more
it conquers and formally incorporates areas that it cannot properly integrate
culturally. Thus, the inevitable collapse of any empire leaves behind itself,
after the devastation, a void — the same void, as if multiplied, or involuted,
to which its very existence was due.
The void was filled, after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire,
by the emerging nations, where life was maintained and given meaning
by the Christian Church. After the schism of the Reformation, this even-
tually led, after the treaty of Westphalia, to the emerging absolutist states.
The revolutions transformed the absolutist states into unified nation-states,
but — as Tocqueville realized so well — by no means altered the drive
towards centralization and uniformity. Such developments, far from repre-
senting “progress” in an absolute and universal sense, rather implied the
formation of an increasingly homogenized and standardized world in which
the insatiable centralization of states and markets (meaning the stock mar-
kets, one of the most centralized institutions ever invented on the planet)
could progress jointly with a similarly streamlined individualization.
For a series of reasons, this “progress” was blocked in the eastern part
of Europe and its surroundings — mostly for the worse but, in some ways,
perhaps also for the better. While within its core areas, Islam produced, with
its own means, a similar kind of homogenization in the broad lands between
the margins of western Christianity and Islam, areas in close contact with (if
not outright under) the Eastern Roman Empire and thus, following Eastern
Orthodoxy, ethnic and religious diversity survived. This happened because
the successive eastern empires (Byzantine, Ottoman, Austrian — literally
“Eastern” — and Russian/Soviet) failed in both counts where the West suc-
ceeded, in the full ambivalence of the term “success.” In the West, after the
relatively early collapse of the Roman Empire, a Christian civilizing process
emerged, resulting in meaningful and coherent communities, guided by the
three major estates (Church, aristocracy, cities). These entities, after the col-
lapse of the unity of western Christianity, “succeeded” to build, both using
and abusing the previous civilizing process, ever more homogenized and
centralized states, becoming ready to accommodate the new idols of mass
democracy and mass markets, while external, overseas colonial expansion
offered ways to increase resources and exteriorize conflicts. In the East, con-
tinental imperial expansion remained the objective, which, however, repeat-
edly failed to produce integration. The result was the coexistence of weakly
integrated centers and a surviving manifoldness of local communities, many
of which contained strange mixtures of local, indigenous communities:
survivals of failed imperial centralization and homogenization, and migrants
brought in to fill the void left by withdrawing or collapsing empires.
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This is the context into which the various stages of western-driven
“modernization” projects can be inserted. These projects are, since centuries
and with very little learning from previous mistakes, a curious combination
of pure extensions of the colonial mentality — exploit the region, just as
the colonies, in the interests of the mother country; a taken for granted
and self-assertive “civilizing mission,” very different from the original goal
of Christianization; and a desperate effort to clean up and contain the
mess, once the instability of the region was threatening the core countries
themselves. This implied, first, a conscious effort to maintain the empires
(Austrian, Russian, even Soviet) in order to contain the indiscriminate
“savages” of the “East”; then, after the collapse of these empires, an —
often even genuine and well-meant — effort to extend there the benefits
of modern civilization without being aware, in the minimal degree, of the
considerable human price involved in such a homogenizing and liquefying
“civilizing” effort; thus, as an inevitable result, the increasingly mechanized
responses offered by the irritated center that failed to perceive the limits
of its own dogmatic Kantian rationality, thus only perpetuating and fixing
fault lines in the margins. Given the utmost lack of knowledge, interest, and
care by the center in local affairs, and an arrogant belief in the superiority
of its own abstract, “rational,” constructed institutions, such efforts — just as
in the former overseas colonies — created potentially explosive situations,
held together by the threat of force, while the enforced requirement of
identification alongside rigid and absolutized lines time and again only tore
up wounds, unmaking healing processes that at the local level emerged
due to the natural effects of the passing time. Institution-tinkering does not
offer any solution, only tries to freeze conflicts, without healing root causes,
and often at a similarly high price that the fooled migrants of our days
had to pay for their “agents.” Genuine personalities and communities are
not mere constructs, so “constructing” institutions only freezes, temporarily,
the situation, instead of offering a stable, long-run solution; thus, in the
remarkable expression of Jesenko Tešan, a perpetual peace treaty, modeled
on the work of Kant, only generates a permanent, frozen war.
Such western, enlightened, and absolutizing dogmatism was comple-
mented in the East by the particular virulence of a trickster logic that is
bound to emerge and rise to dominance in marginal border zones where and
when transitioriality becomes increasingly permanent. The achievements of
the West, which were partly genuine but partly only outcomes of a merely
quantitative growth of power, generated by social and human homogeniza-
tion, a precondition of technological growth, as Heidegger, Mumford, or
Borkenau perceived so well, had to be transmitted to the East; and such
mediation, communication, commerce, transport, and traffic is a prime area
for the trickster, captured particularly well in the figure of Hermes. Such
tricksters might thrive in nation-building, being more “patriotic” than any
locals, or might, on the contrary, bemoan the hopeless backwardness of
their countrymen, forcing them to follow the tide of “progress,” as they only
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know it better. Most importantly, they might shift with stunning speed from
one position to the other.
Such marginal areas, which are also liminal due to their mediating or
in-between character (between East and West, North and South, Catholicism
and Protestantism, Roman and Orthodox Christianity, Christianity and Islam,
etc.), are particularly prone for falling into a mimetic escalation, which pro-
vides a further breeding ground for trickster figures to emerge and thrive,
preventing any return to normality, given that confusion is the condition of
possibility for tricksters to gain and maintain power.
In the case of ethnic and religious minorities, the possibility of such
trickster logics becoming dominant are even more evident, as the chains of
mediation are even longer, and, thus, their possible abuses greater. This is
all the more so as such mediation often progresses through images, and it
is very easy to appropriate and abuse images. In such trickster exchanges
between the “progressive” center (or quasi-center, itself a mime of the “re-
ally” progressive western core) and the “backward” region, two sets of im-
ages are particularly attractive and are used in most case studies, including
Ireland, where the East–West direction is of course inverted. On the one
hand, irresistible images of wealth, health, progress, and development are
transmitted to the backward regions, telling the tale of what expects those
who fall in the line of progress, giving up every remaining segment of their
“non-modern” “identity.” Such images can of course be appropriated and
retransmitted by local, “alternative,” modernizing centers, who try to claim
that such progress can only be provided through their own, “communist,”
“nationalist,” or “national-socialist” ways. On the other, images of the “back-
ward” area as hapless, suffering victims are spread in the center, catering for
pity, while the same images are also deployed in the marginal areas, mobi-
lizing for a politics of suffering, which can in its due course contaminate the
center as well, reducing politics from an effort to promote public good to an
impossible effort of eliminating all suffering from the world, alongside the
now most influential, Habermas-Rawlsian political philosophy. It is in this
sense that the situation of minorities can be taken as a mirror of the situation
of the entire marginal region — and not only.
Thus, at one level, the situation of such minorities, reflecting the sit-
uation of the entire region, is utterly hopeless. They are chasing a dream
that is proved to be a mirage in the center itself, the mirage of a happy and
wealthy nation-state — just as those migrants who, in their own desperate
situation, are only too happy to believe those tricksters who evoke for them
the dream of living in the West, cheating them out of the small but real
possessions they actually had. Yet, on the other hand, their very marginality
might indeed turn into a value on its own. The articles hint at two possi-
bilities in this regard. First, marginality, for better or worse, can turn into
liminality, and this might offer unprecedented connections and insights—
as liminal conditions and situations are unpredictable—and may touch
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even upon the highest degree of liminality, in between the divine and the
human — though the possibility of trickster interference is also the highest
here. Second, on such margins, in certain ways always and necessarily out-
side the scope of the centers, modes of living different from the mechanized
homogenization of the center can also persist. Combined with the previous
point, this, after all, offers nonnegligible hope.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Permanent liminality, combined with schismogenic processes, is a paradox-
ical state that, however, cannot be escaped from those inside, recalling the
terminology of “iron cage” or “entrapment” with which Max Weber char-
acterized the modern condition. Reasoning, in particular, is unable to offer
any guidance, as it is caught in the web spun from the outside by uprooted,
eternally homeless trickster “rationality,” which is unsuited to understand
political reality that assumes participation and embeddedness in concrete
communities. Yet, the rising dominance of trickster reasoning is helped by
modern science, which is entrapped in its own — vicious — exterior circu-
larity, based on the void that has evident parallels with the void of the “free
and open” public sphere, jointly generating a condition of unreality where,
instead of charismatic leaders, trickster politicians are emerging and increas-
ingly dominate, through the “public sphere,” the space of modern politics
emptied of real presence.
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